Three-types models of multidimensional screening
This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a` la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case
|Date of creation:||Oct 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.economia.unimore.it/|
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