RJV in Product Innovation and the Form of Market Competition
This paper investigates the endogenous choice between price- and quantity-setting behaviour in a duopoly game where firms invest in product development first, and then play a marketing game later. Only in the initial R&D stage, the two firms set up a joint venture in order to share the costs of product innovation. a
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- Svend Albæk & Luca Lambertini, 2004.
"Price vs quantity in duopoly supergames with close substitutes,"
The Annals of Regional Science,
Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 567-577, December.
- S. Albaek & L. Lambertini, 1997. "Price Vs Quantity in Duopoly Supergames With Close Substitutes," Working Papers 303, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- d'Aspremont, C. & Gerard-Varet, L. -A., 1980.
"Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 201-217, October.
- d'ASPREMONT,Â C. & GERARD-VARET, L.-A., . "Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication," CORE Discussion Papers RP 425, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October.
- Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990.
"Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
- Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
- Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer.
- Luca Lambertini, 1997.
"Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games,"
CIE Discussion Papers
1997-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Boyer, M. & Moreaux, M., 1985.
"On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: the Critical Role of the Strategy Space,"
Cahiers de recherche
8524, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1987. "On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: The Critical Role of the Strategy Space," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 217-30, December.
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