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RJV in Product Innovation and the Form of Market Competition

  • Lambertini, L.
  • Poddar, S.
  • Sasaki, D.

This paper investigates the endogenous choice between price- and quantity-setting behaviour in a duopoly game where firms invest in product development first, and then play a marketing game later. Only in the initial R&D stage, the two firms set up a joint venture in order to share the costs of product innovation. a

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Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 668.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:668
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5355
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
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  1. Svend Albæk & Luca Lambertini, 2004. "Price vs quantity in duopoly supergames with close substitutes," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 567-577, December.
  2. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1987. "On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: The Critical Role of the Strategy Space," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 217-30, December.
  3. Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer.
  4. d'ASPREMONT, C. & GERARD-VARET, L.-A., . "Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication," CORE Discussion Papers RP -425, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  6. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October.
  7. Luca Lambertini, 1997. "Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games," CIE Discussion Papers 1997-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
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