Excess Capacity Investment: Government versus Private Firms
A supergame between public and private firms in an oligopolist industry is studied in this paper. We discover that there is a repeated-game equilibrium where the public firm produces less than its one-shot Nash equilibrium quantity, nevertheless the total supply and hence the social welfare are higher than in the one-shot Nash equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the public firm, who is a social welfare maximiser, contracts its production below its full capacity in order to encourage the private firm's expansion.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
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