Efficiency Effects of Punitive Damages
This paper develops a typology of different behaviors that might be viewed as outrageous by a jury and subjected to punitive damages. The paper derives the level of punitive damages for achieving economic efficiency in four different situation - malice and three settings where a jury might find reckless disregard - a rational response to insufficient compensatory damages, a nonrational disregard to risk, and a rational response when compensatory damages are adequate.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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