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Conceptual issues in assessing the welfare impact of the British privatisation programme


  • Jonathan LEAPE



Assessing the welfare impact of a policy on the scale of the British privatisation programme is a daunting task. Four sets of issues raised in the impressive study by Florio et al of the British privatisation programme merit further discussion. One such set of issues relates to the different dimensions of underpricing in the privatisation programme. A second set relates to the welfare impact of one particular aspect of the privatisation programme: the sale of housing by local authorities. A third set of issues relates to taxation. It is argued here that there is evidence to suggest important interactions between the privatisation programme and tax policy over the period, with implications for the ultimate welfare impact of privatisation. A final set of issues relates to the role of the privatisation programme in redefining the broader debate over the delivery of public services and, in particular, the appropriate role of asset ownership

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan LEAPE, 2006. "Conceptual issues in assessing the welfare impact of the British privatisation programme," Departmental Working Papers 2006-13, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  • Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2006-13

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Hendon, Ebbs & Tranaes, Torben, 1991. "Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 453-466, November.
    2. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, March.
    3. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta, 2013. "Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 3, pages 51-77 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2001. "Bargaining power in communication networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 69-87, January.
    6. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
    7. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
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    More about this item


    Privatization; UK; Welfare Impact;

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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