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The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games


  • Burkhard Hehenkamp


Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Burkhard Hehenkamp, 2006. "The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games," Discussion Papers in Economics 05_05, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mik:wpaper:05_05

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