The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games
Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2006|
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