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Explaining Corporativism and Corruption

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  • Luis G. González-Morales

Abstract

A simple contract-theoretic model is used to show that, in a democratic system, positive political rents and efficient provision of public goods can characterize an equilibrium in the political contest. Moreover, this equilibrium is stable under the assumption that a fraction of the political rents can be shared with a subgroup of voters through corporativist arrangements. These features correspond fairly well to the presidential and corporativist political system of post-revolutionary Mexico.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis G. González-Morales, 2001. "Explaining Corporativism and Corruption," Discussion Papers in Economics 01_05, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mik:wpaper:01_05
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