Information and Pollution Permit Markets
In a recent article Smith and Yates (Smith and Yates, 2003) argued that regulators could gain additional information about the optimal number of permits to issue from two-sided markets. This paper argues that they are incorrect in their assertion because the market they refer to is an asymmetric two-sided market in which individuals are only allowed to decrease the number of permits. When a symmetric two-sided market is considered, the public good nature of the problem makes it unlikely that any useful information can come from a two-sided market.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2004|
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