Economic Causality in Light of Philosophical Concepts: Distinctly Idiosyncratic

This paper examines causality in contemporary economics through a philosophical lens. Design-based econometrics, centred on the average treatment effect, treats causal effects as population-level expectations under hypothetical interventions, revealing economic causality as distinctly idiosyncratic when examined against established philosophical traditions. The framework is counterfactual and mechanism-agnostic, permitting 'black-box' identification while selectively drawing on Humean diagnostics. Core identification strategies – difference-in-differences, instrumental variables and regression discontinuity designs – derive from medieval causal logic: Ockham's Method of Difference underpins identification, whereas Scotus's Concurrence Method prefigures robustness-based validation. Yet expectation-based, mechanism-agnostic approaches have limits: they can obscure causal processes, and prioritising identification over validation carries epistemological consequences. The paper clarifies the methodological assumptions underlying modern causal inference and highlights the tension between practical policy goals and philosophical rigour in contemporary economics.