A case for Ambiguity
A sender wishes to be approved by a receiver, who is outcome concerned. She then has an incentive to send an informative message. But if there is more than one sender competing for the receiver's approval and the latter doubts about the objectives of senders, they each have an incentive to fool the receiver and look as the only truthful sender in the population. If they succeed, no truthful equilibrium exists. In this scenario, we show that it may be in the decision maker's interest to be ambiguous about his motives as, if prospering, he could guarantee revelation of information by (at least) outcome concerned senders.
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