IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A case for Ambiguity


  • Ascención Andina-Díaz

    () (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)


A sender wishes to be approved by a receiver, who is outcome concerned. She then has an incentive to send an informative message. But if there is more than one sender competing for the receiver's approval and the latter doubts about the objectives of senders, they each have an incentive to fool the receiver and look as the only truthful sender in the population. If they succeed, no truthful equilibrium exists. In this scenario, we show that it may be in the decision maker's interest to be ambiguous about his motives as, if prospering, he could guarantee revelation of information by (at least) outcome concerned senders.

Suggested Citation

  • Ascención Andina-Díaz, 2009. "A case for Ambiguity," Working Papers 2009-8, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  • Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2009-8

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: First version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Multiple experts; approval; two sided incomplete information;

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2009-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Samuel Danthine). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.