Contracting under asymmetric holding cost information in a serial supply chain with a nearly profit maximizing buyer
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KeywordsAsymmetric information; Supply chain coordination; Contracting; Behavioral modeling;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-09-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2012-09-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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