Risk Aversion and Incentives
We consider decision-makers facing a risky wealth prospect. The probability distribution depends on pecuniary effort, e.g., the amount invested in a venture or prevention expenditures to protect against accidental losses. We provide necessary local conditions and sufficient global conditions for greater risk aversion to induce more (or less) investment or to have no effect. We apply our results to incentives in the principal-agent framework when differently risk averse agents face the same monetary incentives.
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