Bailouts in Federations
This dissertation deals with the topic of bailouts in federations. Institutions and instruments helping to alleviate the incentive problems arising from bailouts are analyzed. In particular, the role of the timing of elections, bailout restrictions and the exploitation of budgetary information from comparable jurisdictions is considered.
|Date of creation:||27 Jan 2010|
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