Resolving the Eurozone Crisis--Without Debt Buyouts, National Guarantees, Mutual Insurance, or Fiscal Transfers
One of the reasons for the failure of Europe's governing bodies to resolve the eurozone crisis is resistance to debt buyouts, national guarantees, mutual insurance, and fiscal transfers between member-states. Stuart Holland argues that none of these are necessary to convert a share of national bonds to Union bonds or for net issues of eurobonds--two alternative approaches to the debt crisis that would offset default risk and, by securing the euro as a reserve currency, contribute to more balanced global growth.
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