Reciprocity, Harmonisation and Mutual and Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Measures: A Political Economy Perspective
This paper discusses the issue of regulatory protectionism and its implication for reciprocity and international bargaining on regulation. In a simple two way trade model a la Brander and Spencer, we take into account the three following features of regulatory measures: a) a regulation raises the cost not only of foreign producers but also of domestic producers, b) a regulation creates a fixed cost which is entirely supported by foreign exporters, c) a regulation may provide a welfare gain valued per se by individuals or to correct some market failure. In this context, we investigate the political economy forces for unilateral regulatory protectionism and the effectiveness of various intra-sectorial bargaining schemes (negotiated reciprocal regulation setting, harmonization or mutual recognition agreements) to ensure reciprocal market access.
|Date of creation:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: INRA-LEA, 48, Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France|
Phone: 331 43136364
Fax: 331 43136362
Web page: http://www.inra.fr/Internet/Departements/ESR/UR/lea/index.html
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lea:leawpi:0102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Madeleine Roux)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.