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Rules and Enforcement - 2


  • Horacio Piffano


This note is a new version of the one already released this year making a conceptual analysis of what the author developed in detail in his 2012 paper dealing with crises and economic models. It re-emphasizes the need to introduce into the discussion the question of the moral behavior of economic agents and the institutional designs that define the scenario of their actions. It attempts an explanation why ergodic theory poses limitations to possible predictions, while insisting on the need for the introduction of formal regulation rules in financial markets and fiscal and monetary rules for governments. Finally suggests that the trade off between free market and regulation, faces a serious dilemma, due to existing of an incomplete financial market with strong managing information asymmetries between those who manage funds in financial entities and citizens who deposited these funds in those entities, but at the same time, regulation will also faces an imperfect market, perhaps the most imperfect of all markets, which is the agency contract between representatives and citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Horacio Piffano, 2013. "Rules and Enforcement - 2," Department of Economics, Working Papers 100, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
  • Handle: RePEc:lap:wpaper:100

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Peltzman, Sam, 1990. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 27-63, April.
    2. Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
    3. Peltzman, Sam, 1998. "Political Participation and Government Regulation," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226654164.
    4. Stigler, George J, 1973. "General Economic Conditions and National Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 160-167, May.
    5. Abrams, Burton A & Settle, Russell F, 1978. "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 245-257, April.
    6. Case, Anne C. & Rosen, Harvey S. & Hines, James Jr., 1993. "Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 285-307, October.
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    More about this item


    Economic models; crises; institutions; policies; regulations;

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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