A seCure reversion protocol that generates payoffs dominating correlated equilibrium
We define the reversion protocol of a voluntarily implementable Bayesian mechanism in which risk-averse players have no incentive to cheat or to deviate from the mediator’s recommendation and that can greatly improve their equilibrium expected payoffs as compared to those generated through coordination applied to the results of an unsatisfactory mediation.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2010|
|Date of revision:||Sep 2010|
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