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Mécanismes Bayésiens incitatifs et stricte compétitivité


  • Cédric Wanko


Dans un univers Bayésien non coopératif avec mécanisme incitatif, ce travail explore la notion de rationnalité individuelle par l’intermédiaire de la robustesse des équilibres de Nash. On laisse les joueurs pondérer leur participation au mécanisme en fonction de leurs a priori marginaux sachant la contrainte de robustesse. On montre que i) l’approche non coopérative permet l’extension des propriétés affaiblies des jeux à 2 joueurs à somme nulle aux propriétés de la solution située sur l’enveloppe convexe de cet ensemble ii) l’ensemble des équilibres réalisables incitatifs avec contrainte de robustesse généralise l’ensemble des équilibres réalisables incitatifs sans contrainte de robustesse iii) sachant une constante de différenciation des types nulle, l’ensemble des équilibres réalisables incitatifs converge vers un jeu 2 joueurs à somme nulle.

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  • Cédric Wanko, 2008. "Mécanismes Bayésiens incitatifs et stricte compétitivité," Working Papers 08-02, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:08-02

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Martijn van Hasselt, 2005. "Bayesian Sampling Algorithms for the Sample Selection and Two-Part Models," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 241, Society for Computational Economics.
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