IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Mécanismes Bayésiens incitatifs et stricte compétitivité

Listed author(s):
  • Cédric Wanko
Registered author(s):

    Dans un univers Bayésien non coopératif avec mécanisme incitatif, ce travail explore la notion de rationnalité individuelle par l’intermédiaire de la robustesse des équilibres de Nash. On laisse les joueurs pondérer leur participation au mécanisme en fonction de leurs a priori marginaux sachant la contrainte de robustesse. On montre que i) l’approche non coopérative permet l’extension des propriétés affaiblies des jeux à 2 joueurs à somme nulle aux propriétés de la solution située sur l’enveloppe convexe de cet ensemble ii) l’ensemble des équilibres réalisables incitatifs avec contrainte de robustesse généralise l’ensemble des équilibres réalisables incitatifs sans contrainte de robustesse iii) sachant une constante de différenciation des types nulle, l’ensemble des équilibres réalisables incitatifs converge vers un jeu 2 joueurs à somme nulle.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    File Function: First version, 2008
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 08-02.

    in new window

    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2008
    Date of revision: Feb 2008
    Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:08-02
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2

    Phone: +33-467-158-568
    Fax: +33-467-158-467
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:08-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Modat)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.