Centralization and Local Public Finance in Russia
In this paper, we consider the effects of the 2003 local government reform (Law 131) on the budgetary systems of local governments in Russia, paying special attention to the allocation of functions and tax resources between different levels of government. An evaluation based on the standard theory of fiscal federalism and an international comparison indicated that Russia's institutional characteristics exhibit two parallel and contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, they tend to normalize according to the theory of public finance, but, on the other hand, the administrative and budgetary systems become centralized, which contradicts the global trend of decentralization.
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|Date of creation:||Mar 2010|
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