Optimal Execution in a Market with Small Investors
We consider the dynamic trading strategies that minimize the expected cost of trading a large block of securities over a fixed finite number of periods and the endogenously determined price impact function that yields the execution prices for individual trades. This analysis is novel in that it introduces market participants other than institutional investors and constructing a general equilibrium model. We find that institutional investors are much more likely to speculate to exploit private informations and price impact function changes over time, which has been left unnoticed in the existing literature.
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||May 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/eng/index.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:653. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ryo Okui)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.