The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational
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Other versions of this item:
- Schultz, Christian, 1995. " The Politics of Persuasion When Voters Are Rational," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(3), pages 357-368, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Voß, Achim & Lingens, Jörg, 2014.
"What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats,"
CAWM Discussion Papers
67, University of Münster, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM).
- Achim Voß & Jörg Lingens, 2014. "What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats," Working Papers 2014.66, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Tilman Klumpp, 2011. "Populism, Partisanship, and the Funding of Political Campaigns," Emory Economics 1107, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
- Schultz, Christian, 2002. "Policy biases with voters' uncertainty about the economy and the government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 487-506, March.
- Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2016. "Information in elections: Do third inflexible candidates always promote truthful behavior?," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 307-339, August.
- Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
- Allcott, Hunt & Lederman, Daniel & Lopez, Ramon, 2006. "Political institutions, inequality, and agricultural growth : the public expenditure connection," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3902, The World Bank.
- Mike Felgenhauer, 2012. "Revealing information in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 55-68, October.
- Joungseok Park, 2016. "Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data," Working Papers 16-19, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
More about this item
Keywordseconomic models of political processes; social choice studies; voting;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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