IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuieci/2000-09.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Noncooperative R&D and Optimal R&D Cartels

Author

Listed:
  • Rabah Amir

    (University of Southern Denmark, Odense)

  • Igor Evstigneev

    (Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow)

  • John Wooders

    (University of Arizona)

Abstract

This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of optimal R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers. Within the context of a standard specification, we provide conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.

Suggested Citation

  • Rabah Amir & Igor Evstigneev & John Wooders, 2000. "Noncooperative R&D and Optimal R&D Cartels," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:2000-09
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Temimi, Akram & Dakhlia, Sami & Menezes, Flavio Marques, 2001. "Duplication of R&D and industry concentration," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 437, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    oligopolistic R&D; Spillovers; research joint ventures; R&D cartel;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:2000-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciekudk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.