A Simple Model of Raiding Opportunities and Unemployment
This paper studies the impact of raiding opportunities in a competitive labor market where firms have complete information about the ability of employed workers but are incompletely informed regarding the ability of the unemployed. In equilibrium, some high-ability workers are involuntarily unemployed: unemployment is structural and too high. Moreover, in contrast to other models with wage-setting firms, wages are set so that employed workers strictly prefer equilibrium behavior. Finally, concerning the unemployment problem the paper focuses on the role played by the firms and reveals new insight into the effectiveness of requiring active search from people who claim unemployment benefits and of benefit reforms.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark|
Phone: (+45) 3532 4411
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:96-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.