Fiscal Policy, Public Debt Stabilzation and Politics: Theory and evidence from the US and UK
This paper presents a two-party model of fiscal and debt policy which; (i) explicitly models the partisan, stabilisation, and (to some extent) survival motives of politicians; (ii) has predictions that are largely consistent with existing empirical finding about partisan and electoral effects in government expenditure, tax revenue, and debt; (iii) yields new predictions about how the feedback of fiscal policy on lagged debt may depend on partisan and electoral effects. These new predictions are not rejected by a test of the model on US and UK data.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark|
Phone: (+45) 3532 4411
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:94-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.