Strategic Trade Policy and Integration
Will the incentives to pursue strategically motivated trade or industrial policies rise of rall if countries integrate? Economists have emphasized that one of the principal channels for welfare gains of Europe 1992 is a reduction of intra-European real trade coosts. This paper identifies the spillover effects that such trade cost reductions might have on industrial policies aimed at strategic distortions in oligopolistic industries. We use a three country, conjectural variations oligopoly model covering three countries, whose government choose a general production subsidy/tax to target international strategic distortions. Integration is modeled as a reduction of trade costs for two of these countries, and we analyse how this affects the policy outcome in a non-cooperative policy game.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark|
Phone: (+45) 3532 4411
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:93-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.