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Correlation in Repeated Games with Public Monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Pavlo Prokopovych

    (Kyiv School of Economics and Kyiv Economics Institute)

Abstract

This paper studies correlation in discounted infinitely repeated games with public monitoring. Two extensions of the perfect public equilibrium are proposed: the public correlated equilibrium, where a correlation device sends private correlated messages to the players at the beginning of each period, and the public augmented equilibrium, where the device also publicly informs the players of the recommended action profile at the end of each period. The set of public correlated equilibrium payoffs is compared to the set of subgame perfect publicly correlated equilibrium payoffs in the perfect monitoring case. It is shown that augmented correlation produces efficiency gains in the repeated partnership game by Radner et al. (1986).

Suggested Citation

  • Pavlo Prokopovych, 2008. "Correlation in Repeated Games with Public Monitoring," Discussion Papers 14, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Feb 2009.
    • Handle: RePEc:kse:dpaper:14
    Note: Under review in International Journal of Game Theory
    as

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    File URL: http://repec.kse.org.ua/pdf/KSE_dp14.pdf
    File Function: January 2008
    Download Restriction: no
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated Games; Extensive form correlation; Efficiency; Imperfect public monitoring; Perfect monitoring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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