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Free Entry and Multiple Downstream Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Qing Hu

    (Kansai University and Kobe University)

  • Ryo Masuyama

    (Kushiro Public University of Economics and Kobe University)

  • Tomomichi Mizuno

    (Kobe University)

Abstract

This study analyzes how intermarket spillovers through a common upstream firm affect the efficiency of free entry. We consider a model in which an upstream firm supplies a common input to two independent downstream markets, one with free entry and the other with an incumbent. We show that the effect of entry on the input price depends on the relative size of the entry market. When the entry market is relatively small, entry lowers the input price and generates positive spillovers, which tend to result in insufficient entry. In contrast, when it is relatively large, entry raises the input price and generates negative spillovers, which tend to result in excess entry. We further show that this mechanism relies on uniform input pricing but not on monopoly in either downstream or upstream markets. These findings highlight the importance of intermarket spillovers for evaluating the efficiency of free entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Qing Hu & Ryo Masuyama & Tomomichi Mizuno, 2026. "Free Entry and Multiple Downstream Markets," Discussion Papers 2616, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
  • Handle: RePEc:koe:wpaper:2616
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    File URL: http://www.econ.kobe-u.ac.jp/RePEc/koe/wpaper/2026/2616.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2026
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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