Author
Listed:
- Danyang Jia
(School of Cybersecurity, and School of Artificial Intelligence, OPtics and ElectroNics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, CHINA)
- Ivan Romić
(School of Cybersecurity, and School of Artificial Intelligence, OPtics and ElectroNics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, CHINA, Center for Computational Social Science, Kobe University, Kobe University, JAPAN)
- Lei Shi
(School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, CHINA)
- Qi Su
(Department of Automation, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Key Laboratory of System Control and Information Processing, Ministry of Education of China, and Shanghai Engineering Research Center of Intelligent Control and Management, CHINA)
- Chen Liu
(School of Ecology and Environmental Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, CHINA)
- Jinzhuo Liu
(School of Software, Yunnan University, CHINA)
- Petter Holme
(Center for Computational Social Science, Kobe University, JANPAN and Department of Computer Science, Aalto University, FINLAND)
- Xuelong Li
(School of Cybersecurity, and School of Artificial Intelligence, OPtics and ElectroNics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University and Institute of Artificial Intelligence (TeleAI), China Telecom Corp Ltd, CHINA)
- Zhen Wang
(School of Cybersecurity, and School of Artificial Intelligence, OPtics and ElectroNics (iOPEN), Northwestern Polytechnical University, CHINA)
Abstract
The awareness of individuals regarding their social network surroundings and their capacity to use social connections to their advantage are well-established human characteristics. Economic games, incorporated with network science, are frequently used to examine social behaviour. Traditionally, such game models and experiments artificially limit players' abilities to take varied actions toward distinct social neighbours, thereby constraining their social networking agency. We designed an experimental paradigm that alters this agency and applied it to the prisoner's dilemma (N = 735), trust game (N = 735), and ultimatum game (N = 735) to investigate cooperation, trust, and fairness. Granting participants greater network agency led to more prosocial behaviour across all three economic games, resulting in higher wealth and lower inequality compared to control groups. These findings suggest that incorporating social networking agency into experimental designs better captures the prosocial potential of human behaviour.
Suggested Citation
Danyang Jia & Ivan Romić & Lei Shi & Qi Su & Chen Liu & Jinzhuo Liu & Petter Holme & Xuelong Li & Zhen Wang, 2023.
"Social Networking Agency and Prosociality Are Inextricably Linked in Economic Games,"
Discussion Paper Series
DP2023-11, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Oct 2025.
Handle:
RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2023-11
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