The Strategic Effects of Parallel Trade～Market stealing and wage cutting～
Why do producers often accept parallel trade in some markets such as automobiles, clothing, toys and consumer electronics? This paper identifies two new factors, viz., market stealing and union-wage cutting, which may make parallel trading beneficial to a manufacturer. Specifically, (i) under perfectly competitive labour markets in both the home and foreign countries, parallel trade may help a manufacturer to steal market shares from competitors, if it is more cost efficient or sells in more markets than competitors; and (ii) in a unionized labour market, parallel trade may help by lowering the unionized wage. These benefits of parallel trade disappear when such factors are removed.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2010|
|Date of revision:|
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