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On Auctions within a Ring of Collusive Bidders

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  • Takayuki Oishi

    (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University)

Abstract

Rings of collusive bidders at an English auction frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of knockouts. This paper presents a model of sequences of knockouts. I investigate the relationship between the distributive outcome of each sequence and each solution of bidding ring games. I show that each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core. In particular, a sequence of knockouts with the finest nested rings yields the Shapley value. Also, a sequence of knockouts at each of which a ring can guarantee its advantage for itself yields the nucleolus.

Suggested Citation

  • Takayuki Oishi, 2008. "On Auctions within a Ring of Collusive Bidders," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2008-019, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    • Handle: RePEc:kei:dpaper:2008-019
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