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I win it's fair, you win it's not. Selective heeding of merit in ambiguous settings

Author

Listed:
  • Serhiy Kandul

    (Digital Society Initiative, University of Zurich, Switzerland)

  • Olexandr Nikolaychuk

    (Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany)

Abstract

One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. Our findings suggest that there may be some positive level of dissatisfaction with virtually any social outcome in the populace without there being anything wrong as far as the underlying procedure. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon.

Suggested Citation

  • Serhiy Kandul & Olexandr Nikolaychuk, 2021. "I win it's fair, you win it's not. Selective heeding of merit in ambiguous settings," Jena Economic Research Papers 2021-002, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2021-002
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    File URL: http://www2.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2021/wp_2021_002.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fairness; entitlement; merit; redistribution; procedural preferences; dictator game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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