Zur aktuellen Diskussion des Just-Retour in der EWU: Seigniorage-Wettbewerb und Verteilungsspielraeume aus fiskalischer Sicht
With the forthcoming single currency the current discussion on fair returns not only focuses on the transfers to the EC but also on the implicit gains and losses in seigniorage revenues for each single participant of the EMU. After a short clarification of differient concepts of seigniorage and their pros and cons, a comparative survey of the latest research on seigniorage distribution within the EMU is given. Comparing the results it becomes obvious that the potential gains and losses are massive (up to -90 billion DEM in total seigniorage wealth and up to 5,3 billion DEM p.a. in the case of Germany) and will hence cause severe political pressure to correct the distribution scheme for the revenues of the ECB towards a fairer distribution of seigniorage, for which this paper suggests an alternative key of distribution. Although this view might be somewhat shortsighted the question might be raised whether this quid pro quo proceeding is compatible with ideas of solidarity and fiscal federalism as laid down in the European treaties.
|Date of creation:||15 Aug 1997|
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