(Self-)Regulation of a Natural Monopoly via Complementary Goods - the Case of F/OSS Business Models
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More about this item
Keywordsnatural monopoly; regulation; Ramsey pricing; welfare; complementary good; Open Source Software;
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-11-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2005-11-19 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-11-19 (Public Economics)
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