IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/jen/jenasw/2004-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Voluntary Commitment to Environmental Protection: A Bounded Rationality Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Markus Pasche

    () (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)

Abstract

Global environmental protection is characterized as a public good. In contrast to the national level where the state is able to regulate external effects, there is a lack of supranational institutions which have enough power to force countries to reduce pollution levels. In spite of the free-riding problem it can nevertheless be observed that countries sometimes commit themselves to contribute to the public good `environmental protection'. The case of the Kyoto protocol for global $CO_2$ reduction demonstrates that some countries make substantial volunatry contributions, but others do not or on a much less level. The paper provides a game-theoretic explanation how the free-riding-problem can be overcome to some extent by voluntary cooperative behavior. It is analysed under which conditions free-riding countries can be motivated to make at least small pollution reduction efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Pasche, 2004. "Voluntary Commitment to Environmental Protection: A Bounded Rationality Approach," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 22/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  • Handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2004-22
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roland Helm & Michael Steiner & Armin Scholl & Laura Manthey, 2004. "A Comparative Empirical Study on Common Methods for Measuring Preferences," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 20/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    2. Uwe Cantner & Kristina Dreßler & Jens J. Krüger, 2004. "Firm Survival in the German Automobile Industry," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 08/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    3. Uwe Cantner & Werner Güth & Andreas Nicklisch & Torsten Weiland, 2004. "Competition in Innovation and Imitation - A Theoretical and Experimental Study -," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 01/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    4. Uwe Cantner & Werner Gueth & Andreas Nicklisch & Torsten Weiland, 2003. "Competition in Innovation and Imitation - A Theoretical and Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    5. Roland Helm & Michaela Ludl, 2004. "Kundenkarten als Kundenbindungsinstrument des Handels," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 07/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    6. Uwe Cantner & Kristina Dreßler & Jens J. Krüger, 2006. "Firm survival in the German automobile industry," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 49-60, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    global environmental policy; public good; voluntary cooperation; bounded rationality; game theory.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2004-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://www.wiwi.uni-jena.de/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.