The Economics of Self-regulation in telecommunications under sunset legislation
Overregulation is one major obstacles to the free and innovative development of markets, even if these markets needed regulation after the privatization of a former monopolist. As a radical change of the regulatory regime could endanger it as a whole, the objective is to find a transitory regime which is limiting regulatory errors. One way is combining the regulatory instruments of sunset- regulation and self-regulation. We discuss conditions for successful self-regulation under sunset legislation. We conclude that a fast moving market such as the telecommunications sector should be subject to such an innovative regulatory regime.
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