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Vergtungspräferenzen des F&E-Anbieters - Eine empirische Untersuchung

Listed author(s):
  • Martin Kloyer


    (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)

Registered author(s):

    Wenn F&E-Zulieferer nicht ihren Präferenzen entsprechend vergtet werden, drohen mehrere Formen opportunistischen Leistungserstellungsverhaltens. In einer empirischen Untersuchung wird aus dem Zusammentreffen von Vergütungsformen und Machtvorsprung des Anbieters auf die Präferenz geschlossen. Danach sind Anbieter mit Präferenz für eine kontinuierliche, ertragsabhängige Vergütung von solchen zu unterscheiden, die selbst die komplementären Ressourcen kontrollieren und keine explizite Vergtungspräferenz haben. (English Summary: R&D-suppliers, who are not compensated according to their preferences, are motivated to behave opportunistically. In an empirical study the coincidence of a power asymmetry in favour of the supplier and a certain compensation is interpreted as a preference for this compensation. The results show that it has to be differentiated between one supplier type who prefers a continuous compensation, which depends on the innovation return, and another type, who controls the complementary assets himself and has no preference.)

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    Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) with number 25/2003.

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    Date of creation: Nov 2003
    Handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2003-25
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