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Verhandlungsmacht und Ertragsverteilung in vertikalen Innovationskooperationen - Eine empirische Untersuchung

Anbieter von F&E-Leistungen k�nnen wegen asymmetrischer Informationsverteilung zu Lasten des Abnehmers erst nach Vertragsschlu��eine kontinuierliche Beteiligung am Innovationsertrag aushandeln. Der Beitrag nennt die Determinanten der hierf�r erforderlichen nachvertraglichen Verhandlungsmacht und zeigt empirisch, wie diese mit den Determinanten der vorvertraglichen Verhandlungsmacht zusammenh�ngen.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät in its series Working Paper Series A with number 2001-01.

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Date of creation: 01 May 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jen:jenabe:2001-01
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