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Stock Options, Managerentscheidungen und (eigentliches) Aktionärsinteresse - Korrekturbedarfe einer fehlgeleiteten Diskussion um "anreizkompatible" Vergütungsdesigns


  • Wolfgang Kürsten

    () (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)


Stock Options sollen zur Angleichung der Interessen von Managern und Aktionären beitragen. Aus Sicht risikofreudiger Aktionäre geht es insbesondere darum, mit Hilfe des konvexen Zahlungsanspruchs von Stock Options die Risikoaversion von Managern mit nicht-diversifiziertem Arbeitseinkommen zu kompensieren. Der Beitrag zeigt im Kontext neoklassischer Kapitalmarktmodelle, daß sich die Aktionäre weder um risikoarme Managerentscheidungen sorgen müssen noch Stock Options das geeignete Instrument zur Überwindung differierender Risikopräferenzen darstellen. Aus Sicht der Principal-Agent-Theorie müssen die Reaktionen externer Stakeholder berücksichtigt und die Manager mit einem Proportionalanspruch anstelle mit Stock Options entlohnt werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Kürsten, 2000. "Stock Options, Managerentscheidungen und (eigentliches) Aktionärsinteresse - Korrekturbedarfe einer fehlgeleiteten Diskussion um "anreizkompatible" Vergütungsdesigns," Working Paper Series A 2000-07, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  • Handle: RePEc:jen:jenabe:2000-07

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