Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies
In economies with public goods, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic selections from the set of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations. Such selections exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. This requirement is very restrictive in the context oC more than one public good. However, whenever it holds any such mechanism must choose an egalitarian equivalent allocation.
|Date of creation:||Jul 1996|
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