C^3 Modelling With Symmetrical Rationality
In the absence of contrary information, it would seem prudent for competitors to attribute to their opposition the same level of rationality they attribute to themselves. Using a simple but interesting C^3 (command, control, and communication) problem for illustration, a method is proposed for incorporating symmetrical rationality without resorting to the general multistage game framework which has proved difficult to apply in practice. A "criterion filtering" technique is then proposed for the approximate solution of the resulting model which does not require integration operations and which appears to be especially well suited for C^3 problems with finite admissible control sets. Annotated pointers to related work can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/cfhome.htm
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|Date of creation:||01 Jan 1980|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation 1980, vol. 6, pp. 51-61|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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