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Zur Effizienz von Transferrestriktionen im europäischen Profifussball

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  • Helmut Dietl
  • Egon Franck

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich
    Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

Abstract

In Reaktion auf das sogenannte Bosman-Urteil des europäischen Gerichts-hofs (EuGH) vom 15. Dezember 1995 und die daran anknüpfenden Überprü-fungsaktivitäten der EU-Kommission legte die Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) zum 1. September 2001 ein modifiziertes Reglement zum Transfer von Fußball-Spielern vor. Wir nehmen das neue FIFA-Regime zum Anlass, um die Diskussion der Spielermarktregulierung auf ein bislang weitgehend vernachlässigtes Argumentationsfeld zu führen. Aufgrund ihrer Diversifikationsmöglichkeiten können Clubs ihre Spieler nur dann teil-weise gegen die aus Leistungsschwankungen resultierenden Einkommensri-siken versichern, wenn sich letztere glaubhaft der Möglichkeit berauben, ge-schlossene Verträge in der Zukunft nach zu verhandeln. Da das neue FIFA-Reglement diese Möglichkeit erheblich einschränkt bzw. ausschließt, führt es zu einer ineffizienten Risikobewirtschaftung.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck, 2002. "Zur Effizienz von Transferrestriktionen im europäischen Profifussball," Working Papers 0011, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  • Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. El-Hodiri, Mohamed & Quirk, James, 1971. "An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1302-1319, Nov.-Dec..
    3. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-979, December.
    4. Glenn C. Loury, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
    5. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
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