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Kantians, selfish and "nice" agents: some implications for normative public policy

Listed author(s):
  • Paulo Trigo Pereira
  • José Pedro Pontes

Public choice theory postulate that agents in a non-market setting are instrumentally rational and selfish. However, this approach creates some problems related to the raison d'etre of the normative public choice research programme. This paper considers interaction in two different environments, of instrumental rational agents and moral agents behaving according to kantian practical reason. The first environment, is a step-level contribution to a pure public good in repeated single-shot prisoners' dilemma (PD) games where agents learn the total contribution after each round. The second is infinitely repeated PID games, where agents are randomly selected from the same group of individuals. An evolutionary analysis shows that kantians, although not playing the games, may have an important influence on the evolutionary stability of the tit-for-tat Nash equilibrium.

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Paper provided by ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa in its series Working Papers Department of Economics with number 1999/02.

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Date of creation: 1999
Handle: RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp21999
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Department of Economics, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL

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