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On the existence of equilibrium in an incomplete financial economy with numeraire assets

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  • Cuong Le Van
  • Ali Oguz Polat
  • Hüseyin Cagri Saglam

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  • Cuong Le Van & Ali Oguz Polat & Hüseyin Cagri Saglam, 2014. "On the existence of equilibrium in an incomplete financial economy with numeraire assets," Working Papers 2014-106, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-106
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    References listed on IDEAS

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