IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ioe/doctra/505.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Silva

Abstract

I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent’s type only affects the principal’s utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent’s type, which can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent’s report. I define renegotiation proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one: there is pooling on top – types above a threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold report truthfully - and no regret on top - the mechanism is sequentially optimal for the principal after the agent reports to be the largest type.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Silva, 2017. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Documentos de Trabajo 505, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:505
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt_505.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:505. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jaime Casassus (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iepuccl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.