Strategic Information Spillover to be Imitated: Incentive to Make Use of Relative Performance Evaluation
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KeywordsBlame sharing; Endogenous timing of actions; Herding; Information spillover; Informational externalities; Payoff externalities;
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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