IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Political Interaction in the Senate: Estimating a Political “Spatial” Weights Matrix and an Application to Lobbying Behavior


  • B. Andrew Chupp

    () (Department of Economics, Illinois State University)


Many motivations exist that cause legislators to behave strategically when voting. However, it is difficult to uncover the magnitude of the interaction among politicians. This paper takes a “spatial” approach to the problem, using a spatial autoregressive model where the elements of the spatial weights matrix are estimated as parameters. The political spatial weights matrix is calculated for 96 senators in the U.S. 110th Congress. Furthermore, I calculate the overall effect on voting from “flipping” a senator’s vote. I apply these measures to study political fundraising, mildly suggesting that political interest groups direct donations to senators with the most influence.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Andrew Chupp, 2011. "Political Interaction in the Senate: Estimating a Political “Spatial” Weights Matrix and an Application to Lobbying Behavior," Working Paper Series 20111006, Illinois State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ils:wpaper:20111006

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: First version, 2011
    Download Restriction: no


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:jecfin:v:42:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s12197-017-9420-z is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Joshua C. Hall & Christopher Shultz & E. Frank Stephenson, 2018. "The political economy of local fracking bans," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 42(2), pages 397-408, April.

    More about this item


    Senate; Strategic Interaction; Yardstick Competition; Logrolling; Spatial Econometrics;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ils:wpaper:20111006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (B. Andrew Chupp). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.