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Self-Fulfilling Crises and Central Bank Communication


  • Raphael Galvão

    (Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

  • Felipe Shalders



This paper studies how much information a Central Bank should release to less informed private agents. Agents have dispersed information about the state of the economy, and their actions are strategic complements. Thus, the Central Bank’s public disclosure of information can generate an undesirable coordination among agents and self-fulfilling crises. We show that the Central Bank will choose an information structure that sends only two messages. We characterize the optimal information structure and prove that it retains the uniqueness equilibrium property of global games. We also show that, without the ability to commit to an information disclosure rule, the Central Bank could be worse o↵ by releasing public information.

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  • Raphael Galvão & Felipe Shalders, 2019. "Self-Fulfilling Crises and Central Bank Communication," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv327, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv327

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