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Colusión en el Mercado de Isapres: Modelación y Evidencia Empírica

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Abstract

Este trabajo muestra empíricamente que las cinco mayores Isapres (aseguradoras privadas de salud) del mercado chileno se coludieron para reducir su cobertura financiera en los planes de seguros de salud ofertados tanto a sus nuevos afiliados como en la renovación anual de los antiguos afiliados. La disminución en la calidad ofrecida de los planes ocurrió entre Marzo de 2002 y Marzo de 2003, lo cual permitió la sustitución completa de planes con menor cobertura para todos los afiliados. En primer lugar, este trabajo muestra que el mercado relevante de análisis para efectos de la libre competencia es el de Isapres abiertas, quedando las Isapres cerradas y Fonasa (el asegurador público) fuera de ese mercado debido a la gran segmentación por tramo de ingresos, edad, condición de salud y sexo principalmente. En segundo lugar, para demostrar la colusión tácita en la reducción de cobertura financiera de los planes de salud, se prueba la existencia de “factores adicionales” consistentes con la hipótesis de colusión e inconsistentes con la de competencia. En particular, se demuestra una reducción en el esfuerzo de venta en el periodo de transición hacia planes de menor calidad, un aumento en las rentabilidades tanto de las Isapres coludidas como de las no coludidas y una disminución en la tasa de traspasos al interior del grupo de las Isapres coludidas.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Agostini & Eduardo Saavedra & Manuel Willington, 2007. "Colusión en el Mercado de Isapres: Modelación y Evidencia Empírica," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv190, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv190
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    Cited by:

    1. Cristian Pardo & Whitney Schott, 2012. "Public versus private: evidence on health insurance selection," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, pages 39-61.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Colusión Tácita; Isapres; Seguros de Salud; Paralelismo Conciente; Factores Adicionales.;

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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