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Cargos de Acceso, Acceso Universal y Telefonía IP

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Abstract

La telefonía IP es percibida como una oportunidad para introducir fuerzas competitivas en el mercado de la telefonía. Sus bajos niveles de inversión requeridos cuando se utiliza una red de acceso existente, su capacidad de integrar nuevos servicios y la “nomadicidad” son sus principales ventajas; en tanto que la alta variabilidad en la calidad del servicio es actualmente su principal desventaja. Este trabajo aborda la problemática de la regulación de cargos de acceso y tarifas en un contexto que explícitamente considera la existencia de un problema de acceso universal, el cual se refleja en tarifas distorsionadas (en la situación pre-telefonía IP), con el cargo por minuto financiando parcialmente los costos fijos. Los principales resultados que se obtienen son dos: primero, asumiendo que no existe diferencia de costos entre las dos tecnologías (ni de calidad de servicio), la fijación de cargos de acceso basados en costos es incompatible con el objetivo de acceso universal y la penetración de la nueva tecnología; y segundo –aun bajo el supuesto de igualdad de costos– la regulación óptima de cargos de accesos y tarifas con la nueva tecnología permite alcanzar una mejora paretiana respecto al caso base.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Willington, 2007. "Cargos de Acceso, Acceso Universal y Telefonía IP," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv182, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv182
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    Keywords

    Cargos de Acceso; VoIP; Acceso Universal;

    JEL classification:

    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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