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Negotiating a win-win end to the lose-lose US-China trade war over technology and critical minerals

Author

Listed:
  • Chad P. Bown

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

The United States and China put parts of the global economy at risk in 2025 through their trade war over critical minerals and technology. A series of escalatory tariffs and export restrictions led to shortages of essential inputs, nearly forcing automakers worldwide to shut down production. The costly policies reflected uncoordinated and uncommunicated efforts by both countries to reduce their mutual economic dependence. This paper explores a novel path for the United States and China to "cooperate" over how they reduce their dependence on each other in technology and critical minerals, with the aim of limiting future escalation risks and avoiding unnecessary costs. The proposal draws on a version of the reciprocal approach to negotiations developed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, modified to accommodate a mutual reduction in each country's market dominance in key sectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Chad P. Bown, 2026. "Negotiating a win-win end to the lose-lose US-China trade war over technology and critical minerals," Working Paper Series WP26-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp26-5
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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